PSI: State control or Public freedom?

The internet has irreversibly changed the scope of demand for PSI and the opportunities for its constructive re-use. How PSI is managed and made available by governments now impacts on a country's growth prospects. As an example, the speaker will reference EURADIN, an EU project to create a framework to allow "addresses" to be shared across Europe and give a synopsis of some of the barriers encountered and their cost.

Policy Recommendations

1. The State should only be concerned with defining what information it requires for good government and procuring it. It should not seek to provide it itself.

2. “What is PSI” should be decided by an independent committee having regard to Statutory obligations, whether the information was self-evidently central to the purpose of government and whether the private sector had shown itself unable or unwilling to provide the information, for example because it is uneconomic to do so. The boundaries must be clear between what is PSI and what is not.

3. The State should continue to own PSI, particularly those which are Statutory in nature (such as land ownership, company or planning records) but this is not the same thing as developing and maintaining the PSI itself.

4. Whilst fee-based charging for a service and related material (eg a planning application) should continue, PSI should be available at the marginal cost of distribution. This has a number of immediate benign effects, probably the most important of which is that it encourages the State to ration PSI to what it really needs for good government and to fulfil its statutory duties – and at minimum cost. The second most important effect is that the terms of PSI licensing will be such that re-use by the private sector and individuals is genuinely encouraged creating innovation and enterprise. In addition, the current internal PSI licensing complexities that bedevil the public sector would largely be eradicated.

5. However, if government policy remains that the State should itself own, maintain and exploit its PSI then government will be obliged either to accept that re-use trading terms will be unfair or it must manage some complex consequences as follows:

a. It must completely separate all PSI providers exploiting data into upstream (basic provision/raw data) and downstream (commercial/added value) arms and ensure that the private sector can acquire upstream data on similar terms to the PSI provider’s commercial arm;

b. It must still decide what PSI it needs for good government and clearly state what the boundaries are;

c. It must put in place proper accounting practices so that products can be genuinely costed on an individual basis and without the cross-subsidisation which occurs at present;

d. It must separate the advice to government received from PSI providers from their commercial interests. Currently advice to government, for example in the UK and France, is conflicted;

e. It must create a substantial Regulatory regime that works. Many of the difficulties that confront re-users of PSI relate to fair competition. Competition Regulators have shown themselves reluctant to take action against their own Governments (except Sweden) and, whilst in the UK we are fortunate to have OPSI, OPSI has limited sanctions to take against offenders and those which it has are unwieldy.

Policy “5” above is therefore and expensive and potentially cumbersome solution. All of these policies would be new to the UK. All have been considered and some recommended by separate independent government-sponsored reports over the past seven years.